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Between the Species
Egalitarianism and Animals

ABSTRACT
The moral consideration of nonhuman animals and the critique of
speciesism have been defended by appeal to a variety of ethical theories. One of the main approaches in moral and political philosophy
today from which to launch such a defense is egalitarianism, which
is the view that we should aim at favoring the worse off by reducing
inequality. This paper explains what egalitarianism is and shows the
important practical consequences it has for nonhuman animals, both
those that are exploited by humans and those in need of aid in the
wild. Egalitarianism implies rejecting speciesism, and in practice it
prescribes ceasing to exploit nonhuman animals as well as assisting them. Moreover, because they are worse off in comparison to
humans, egalitarianism prescribes giving priority to the interests of
nonhuman animals. Due to this, egalitarianism gives us extra reasons to defend them beyond those entailed by other nonspeciesist
approaches.
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1. Introduction
Consider the following cases:
Robin Hood. In some country, a small group of very
poor people are suffering significantly. Harsh weather conditions have ruined their harvest, and they find
themselves in terrible indigence. There are, however,
many other people in this country who are quite rich.
If the rich gave some of their wealth to the poor, they
would improve their situation significantly. However,
they refuse to do so. The rich also claim to have property rights which protect against any redistribution
of their wealth. Nevertheless, a defender of the poor,
Robin Hood, violates those rights (or alleged rights) by
stealing from the rich to help the poor.
Shelter. Ten dogs and five pigs live in an animal shelter.
The shelter facilities are arranged in a way that makes
it possible for the dogs to have a high quality of life,
although it leaves the pigs in a rather poor situation.
Eventually, however, the managers of the shelter carry
out some space redistributions, giving more room to
the pigs. As a result, the pigs end up much better off
than they were before. Neither the pigs nor the dogs
can now enjoy the great state in which the dogs were
before. But everyone is still pretty well off, and no one
has to endure the deplorable conditions the pigs used
to suffer. In this new arrangement, the increase in the
happiness of the pigs is smaller than the reduction in
the happiness of the dogs. But there is greater equality,
and nobody is miserable.
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Some may claim that what Robin Hood is doing is wrong,
as it is a violation of the rights of the rich. Others may claim
that both what Robin Hood did and what the people running
the shelter did were wrong, because they reduced the total sum
of happiness in those scenarios. There are many who would
disagree, however, and claim that Robin Hood and the people
at the animal shelter did the right thing. Who would claim this?
Those who affirm that we should fight inequality and give special consideration to the interests of the worse off. This claim
characterizes egalitarianism, and it matches the opinions many
people hold quite well. No wonder this position has gained
growing support in moral and political philosophy in the last
decades (see for instance Berlin 1955–1956; Williams 1973;
Nagel 1979; 1991; Rae et al. 1981; Arneson 1989; Sen 1980;
1992; Temkin 1993; Parfit 1995; McKerlie 1996; Roemer 1998;
Cohen 1989; 2000; Holtug and Lippert-Rasmussen 2006).
Egalitarianism has many important social and political corollaries for humans, of course. But it also has far more significant consequences for nonhuman animals than many would
think at first. Egalitarianism implies that we should reject
speciesism (the discrimination against those who don’t belong
to a certain species, which is commonly directed against nonhuman animals [Horta 2010a]) and animal exploitation. Moreover, it entails that the defense of nonhuman animals must be
a priority for us, since they are worse off than human beings.
This means that we must not only abstain from harming nonhuman animals, but also work actively for them.
This conclusion shouldn’t be surprising, as the moral consideration of all sentient animals has been defended by way of
all those theories that are most widely accepted today in ethics. Some theorists have argued for the moral consideration of
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nonhuman animals by an appeal to some very general moral
intuitions, with which different ethical perspectives may be
compatible (Singer 2009 [1974]). Others have taken a pluralist
approach, combining what different viewpoints say in its defense (Clark 1977; Sapontzis 1987). Others have maintained it
in light of a Kantian-inspired rights view (Regan (2004 [1983];
Pluhar 1995; Francione 2000; Korsgaard 2005; Franklin 2005)
or a contractarian approach (VandeVeer 1979; Rowlands 1998).
Others, in accordance with a virtue ethics perspective (Dombrowski 1984; Nobis 2002; Hursthouse 2006; Abbate 2014). Or
according to a capabilities approach (Nussbaum 2006). Or a
utilitarian perspective (Singer 2011 [1979]; Matheny 2006). Or
care ethics (Donovan and Adams 2007). It would be strange if
egalitarianism were not added to this list too.
To be sure, most of those who call themselves egalitarians
have failed to see the implications of egalitarianism for nonhuman animals. There have been exceptions (Persson 1993;
Arneson 1999; Vallentyne 2004; Holtug 2007; Bruers 2014;
Faria 2014). There was even an early pioneer, Lewis Gompertz
(1997 [1824]), who defended an egalitarian view and its application to nonhuman animals in the early 19th century, advocating veganism before it even had that name, as well as aiding
animals in need of help in nature. Still, a detailed explanation
of the consequences of egalitarianism for nonhuman animals
hasn’t been carried out yet. Even more importantly, the egalitarian approach to the moral consideration of animals remains
ignored for the most part in the literature on both egalitarianism and animal ethics. As a result, most animal ethicists and
animal activists with an interest in the ethical foundations of
concern for nonhuman animals are unaware of it. This is particularly regrettable since many of them probably have egali-
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tarian intuitions and might readily support this viewpoint if
they knew about it.
This paper aims to help to address this lack of awareness
by explaining how egalitarianism can ground an antispeciesist
viewpoint. The paper argues that those who reject the consequences that egalitarianism has for nonhuman animals are not
assuming what egalitarianism actually entails. It also claims
that egalitarianism places even more importance on the interests of nonhuman animals than other theories do.
In order to do this, section 2 describes what egalitarianism
is, and section 3 clarifies how this view differs from other perspectives. Then, section 4 explains what kinds of different egalitarian positions there are and argues that similar consequences
follow from all of them with regard to nonhuman animals. This
section also distinguishes between a general and a more specific way to understand what egalitarianism is. Section 5 explains
why accepting egalitarianism entails considering the interests
of nonhuman animals and rejecting speciesism. Then, section 6
explains the practical consequences that follow from rejecting
speciesism, which entails both ceasing to exploit nonhuman
animals and helping them actively. Next, section 7 explains
why egalitarians should give priority to nonhuman animals. It
argues that nonhuman animals are in general worse off than
humans, whether they are under human exploitation or they
live in the wild. Then, section 8 considers an objection to this
conclusion based on an appeal to moral status and argues that
such an objection must be rejected. After that, section 9 argues
that egalitarianism provides extra reasons to defend nonhuman
animals beyond what other nonspeciesist approaches may entail. Finally, section 10 summarizes and concludes.
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2. What Is Egalitarianism?
To put it very simply, egalitarianism is the view that we
should aim at reducing inequality. A bit more technically, we
can say that egalitarianism is the view that we should bring
about a less inegalitarian distribution of happiness or wellbeing
(or of whatever else is good), or, alternatively, of what is needed
in order to achieve that good.
The reasons to defend this view aren’t difficult to guess. In
the world we live in, some happen to have bad lives (or even
terrible lives), while others fare quite well. This happens mostly
for reasons that are completely irrelevant in moral terms (Berlin 1955–1956), or even for reasons that are blatantly immoral.
In some cases, this is due to oppression, while in others it’s just
a result of sheer luck. To many of us at least, all this is unfair,
or just bad. Given two individuals who are equally deserving of
and have an equal interest in having a good life, why must one
of them suffer in misery?
This doesn’t mean that equality is the only thing that matters
for egalitarians. Consider a situation in which half of a certain
population are leading very good lives while the other half are
faring terribly. Suppose we simply reduced the happiness of the
ones who are doing well to the level of the happiness of those
who are worse off, but without that leading to any increase in
the happiness of the worse off (Nozick 1974, 229; Raz 1986,
chap. 9). That would reduce inequality. However, egalitarians
can perfectly well claim that this shouldn’t be done. The reason
is that such an increase in equality would be pointless: it would
just reduce the happiness of some without benefiting anyone.
No one has defended such a form of “pure egalitarianism”
(Parfit 1995) against this intuition. Instead, egalitarians typically claim that in addition to equality, we should also promote
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other aims, such as the maximization of general happiness or
the minimization of suffering and other disvalues.
Note, of course, that equality isn’t homogeneity; neither is
inequality diversity. By struggling for equality, we don’t want
to make us all alike: we simply want no one to be worse off
than others.

3. Avoiding confusions
Appeals to equality are common in many fields. But not all
of those who make them are really defending an egalitarian
view proper. So in order to understand what egalitarianism is,
it is important to distinguish it from other views that can be
confused with it.
Egalitarianism Is More than Equal Consideration or
Equal Rights
To start with, the kind of equality egalitarianism is concerned with is different from mere equal consideration of interests. Equal consideration of interests just means that everyone’s
interests count the same, regardless of whose interests they are.
There are many people who reject equal consideration. Racists or sexists, for instance, might claim that some people’s
interests are more important than others’ due to factors such
as their sex, gender or skin color. The word “equality” is often used to mean absence of these forms of discrimination. In
particular, the term “animal equality” often refers to the equal
consideration of the interests of all sentient animals—this is
what Singer (2009 [1974]) meant when he used the motto “All
Animals Are Equal” as the title of the first chapter of his Animal Liberation; see also Dunayer 2001. In other cases, the term
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“equality” is used to mean “equal rights,” especially in the
context of theories which claim that we have moral obligations
toward others because they have rights, and which treat equal
consideration and equal rights as equivalent as a result.
These broad senses of “equality,” however, are different
from the more restricted meaning associated with egalitarianism. In this context, “equality” denotes a situation in which
everyone has the same, or very nearly the same, level of happiness (or of any other valuable thing). Accordingly, egalitarianism means more than “equal consideration” or “equal rights.”
Egalitarianism Implies More than a Consideration of
Marginal Utility
Another idea egalitarianism shouldn’t be confused with is
the consideration that it’s usually easier to improve the situation of those who are faring very poorly than that of those who
are doing pretty well. Suppose that we could give some food
either to a starving animal or to someone else who has some
appetite but is generally well fed and has eaten not long ago.
We know that giving the food to the starving animal is likely
to have a bigger impact. This is because the more we have,
the less our situation improves when we get something good
for us. In economics and philosophy, this is known as the law
of diminishing marginal utility. Those who simply aim at increasing general happiness and/or reducing the total amount of
suffering need to take this into account, even if they don’t care
about equality. Egalitarian views, though, require something
more. Egalitarianism prescribes helping the worse off instead
of the better off even when the increase in happiness (or the reduction of suffering) that we achieve by helping the worse off is
smaller than the one that we could achieve by helping the better
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off. This stronger commitment to the worse off distinguishes
egalitarianism from those views that only care about maximizing the total sum of what is valuable, such as utilitarianism.

4. Different Theories with Egalitarian Corollaries
We have seen how egalitarianism distinguishes itself from
other views. We will now see how different theories that either
are egalitarian or have widely with egalitarian corollaries must
be distinguished from each other.
Consequentialist and Nonconsequentialist Egalitarianism
Some egalitarians claim that the reason why we should fight
for equality is just that it is bad that some are doing worse than
others. Their position is an instance of consequentialism, the
view that we should derive what we should do from a consideration of what states of affairs are better and worse. Others
may not necessarily accept this, but defend that in any case we
should do what we can to achieve a more egalitarian situation
because that is just the right thing to do (Parfit 1995). Their
position is thus a form of nonconsequentialism, the view that
at least some of the duties we have do not derive from which
states of affairs are better than others. In practical terms these
two views may imply the same course of action, although the
reasons why they fight inequality are different.
Equality of What?
Another distinction between egalitarian views has to do
with the question of what should be the “currency” of equality;
that is, of what should be enjoyed equally (Sen 1980; Cohen
1989). According to welfare egalitarianism (Dworkin 1981a)
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there should be equality of wellbeing or happiness, or of whatever else we may consider to be intrinsically good to individuals’ happiness. (Note that despite the similarity of its name,
this position has nothing to do with the view known as “animal
welfarism.” Animal welfarism is the idea that using animals is
justified provided that their suffering is minimized, which assumes a speciesist viewpoint [Francione 1995; Haynes 2008]).
According to another view, resource egalitarianism, there
should be equality of the resources that are necessary to attain
happiness (Dworkin 1981b). A middle way supported by others
has consisted in defending equality of opportunity for happiness (Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Roemer 1998).
There are two main reasons why some defend equality of
resources. First, the fact that someone has sybarite interests
to enjoy luxuries shouldn’t be a reason for him or her to have
more resources than others who are satisfied with less. In reply
to this, however, we must note that individuals may have different capacities to deal with the same resources, so it would
be fair if those who have fewer capacities had more resources
to deal with. Second, with the same resources, some may work
hard while others may simply relax, so it may not be fair if
what each of them attains has to be redistributed. This drives
us to consider yet another distinction among egalitarian views,
which we will see next.
The Question of Desert and Responsibility
According to luck egalitarianism, a view that many egalitarians hold, it is bad that some individuals are worse off than others for reasons unrelated to their own choices – that is, due to
a matter of luck (Dworkin 1981b; Temkin 1993; Arneson 2006;
Knight 2009). Some proponents of this view think that anyone
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who has knowingly done less than others to deserve the benefits they get, or has tried to benefit at the cost of others, should
get less than the rest (Dworkin 1981b; Arneson 1989; Kagan
1998). But others go beyond this view and claim that everyone
should enjoy an equally good situation, regardless of what they
have done and how they have behaved towards others (Persson
2007; Segall 2010, 46–47).
Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism
Finally, there is a distinction to be made between egalitarianism and another theory that defends egalitarian corollaries.
Some theorists claim that inequality is not necessarily worse
than equality, but we should nevertheless give priority to the
interests of those who are faring worse. This view is called
prioritarianism and is different from egalitarianism proper.
However, it has very similar practical consequences (Raz 1986;
McKerlie 1994; Parfit 1995; Temkin 2003; Holtug 2006) and,
as a result, the term “egalitarianism” is sometimes used loosely
to refer to both egalitarianism proper and prioritarianism. Most
of what we will see in this paper concerning egalitarianism and
its implications for animals will be true of prioritarianism as
well.

5. Equality for Nonhuman Animals
Now that we know what egalitarianism consists in, we can
consider what it entails for nonhuman animals.
Egalitarianism Is Concerned with All Sentient Beings
We have seen that egalitarianism is concerned with the distribution of happiness or welfare, or, more generally, with what
is valuable (intrinsically or instrumentally). This means that
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egalitarianism is necessarily concerned with how any entity
with the capacity to enjoy what is valuable and/or to suffer
what is disvaluable fares. In other words, egalitarianism is concerned with how anyone who can be in a happy or unhappy
situation is doing. Egalitarian views consider the interests of
anyone who has interests to consider; otherwise they would not
be aiming at decreasing inequality.
Many nonhuman animals, not only vertebrates but a number
of invertebrates too, are sentient (Smith 1991; Allen and Bekoff
1997; Sneddon 2004; Elwood 2011). Sentient beings can feel
suffering and pleasure, so their lives can go well or ill. This
means that if a certain view is not concerned with the happiness and the harms undergone by nonhuman animals, then it
will be defending something different from what egalitarianism prescribes. An allegedly egalitarian view which limited its
scope to humans would thus be as egalitarian as an allegedly
egalitarian view which limited its scope to males, whites or the
rich, and vindicated equality just for those who belonged to
such groups. Such a view would not be a special case of egalitarianism; by putting that restriction on who the basic principle
which constitutes egalitarianism applies to, it would cease to be
an egalitarian view altogether.
Egalitarianism Is Incompatible with Speciesism
It’s often claimed that human interests count for more because of the cognitive capacities humans have (Leahy 1991;
Carruthers 1992), because humans have certain relationships
of solidarity with each other that they don’t have with other animals (Whewell 1852, 223; Petrinovich 1999), or because they
are more powerful than other animals (Narveson 1987; Goldman 2004). However, opponents of speciesism have pointed
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out that these arguments fail because not all humans satisfy the
moral criteria they assume (Pluhar 1995; Horta 2014). There
are many humans (such as children, or some who have suffered
brain injuries or have some congenital conditions) who lack the
mentioned cognitive capacities. There are others for whom no
one feels any sympathy, or who are powerless in comparison
to other humans (this is the case, for instance, of orphan children who are enslaved in many places around the world). If the
above-mentioned arguments against the equal consideration of
the interests of all sentient animals were right, it would be justified to thwart the interests of all these humans. As a result,
these arguments cannot justify giving inegalitarian preference
to humans over nonhuman animals. This also shows why these
arguments shouldn’t be acceptable to most of us, as we don’t
accept such disadvantageous consideration of certain groups
of humans.
Nonetheless, there’s a deeper reason why a theory such as
egalitarianism must reject that view, and claim it’s actually a
form of discrimination. For egalitarianism, what matters for
the consideration of individuals is how they fare. This means
that what is relevant for being considered is having the capacity
to fare better or worse, that is, to enjoy what is good and suffer
what is bad. The capacity that is needed for that is being able
to feel suffering and/or positive wellbeing. Due to this, all the
mentioned circumstances (their cognitive capacities or their
relations with others) cannot be considered relevant in themselves. To be sure, they can be contextually relevant when they
determine in what way a certain individual suffers or enjoys in
a particular situation. So if in a certain situation having higher
cognitive capacities makes someone more likely to suffer or
enjoy more (for instance, if she can anticipate some harm or
benefit) or less (for instance, if we can alleviate her suffering
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by consoling her), then that should be taken into account. But
those capacities only determine the ways in which different individuals can suffer and enjoy. They are not what distinguishes
those entities that can feel suffering or wellbeing from those
that cannot do so. Having the capacity to have a wellbeing and
to suffer is what distinguishes them. This means that what is
relevant for moral consideration is whether one has the capacity to fare better or worse—that is, to enjoy what is good and
suffer what is bad. This, in turn, requires the capacity to feel
suffering and/or positive wellbeing at all. It also means that
egalitarianism must reject considering, even in combination
with this one, any other criteria that would give priority to human beings over other sentient beings. The reason is simple:
if we accepted any such criteria, we would not be considering only the relative situation of each individual (that is, how
each one is faring), but also other reasons, which would distort our examination of the question. Accepting those criteria
would mean considering the interests of different individuals
unequally. Egalitarianism is incompatible with any view that
promotes inequality like this.
Different Egalitarian Theories Have Similar Consequences for Nonhuman Animals
In section 4, we saw that there are different approaches
within egalitarianism regarding what should be the currency
of equality and whether we should take desert into account.
Those different views have been defended by their proponents
in the context of the discussion regarding equality among human beings, but they don’t have relevantly different conclusions when applied to nonhuman animals. It’s easy to see that
the same human practices that entail that nonhuman animals
are left to suffer and deprived of happiness also deprive them
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of the resources and the opportunity to enjoy happiness. So
welfare egalitarianism and resource egalitarianism would have
the same consequences for nonhuman animals.
In the same vein, taking desert and responsibility into account in luck egalitarianism is not going to have different implications for nonhuman animals either, as most nonhuman
animals cannot reflect on their responsibilities.
All this can be said in the case of prioritarianism too, since
its differences from egalitarianism proper don’t affect its concern for the worse off.

6. Practical Consequences for Nonhuman Animals
Refraining from Exploiting Nonhuman Animals
Despite the reasons we have just seen for rejecting it, speciesism is widely accepted today. Nonhuman animals are systematically harmed in many different ways by human beings. This
is done primarily to obtain a number of animal products out of
them (that is, the flesh of the animals, their eggs, milk, skin,
feathers, etc.), as well as services that entail their exploitation
(for entertainment, in laboratories, for labor, etc.). Such harms
are not trivial ones. They include terrible suffering during most
of their lives (mainly in land farms and fish farms) and depriving them of any or almost any possible positive experiences
they could have, by confining them and, in particular, by killing them (Mason and Singer, 1990 [1980]; Eisnitz 1997; Mood
2010; Mood and Brooke 2012).
In this way, animal exploitation incessantly generates harm
and increases inequality between humans and the nonhumans
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they exploit. It does this by benefiting (in trivial ways) the better off (i.e, humans) by means of harming (in extreme ways)
the worse off (nonhuman animals) (Norcross 2004; McPherson
2014; Bruers 2015). This couldn’t contradict more what egalitarianism prescribes. Consistent egalitarianism thus compels
us to be vegan.
Egalitarianism Entails Helping Nonhuman Animals
As we have seen, concern for those who are worse off implies refraining from harming them, but also trying to improve
their situation. Due to this, egalitarianism not only asks that
each of us ceases to harm animals; it also demands that we help
them actively. There are two main ways to do this:
(1) Doing activism to spread an antispeciesist viewpoint.
(2) Helping those animals who aren’t exploited by humans, but who are nevertheless in need of aid (as happens in the case of many animals who suffer and die
due to natural causes).
It isn’t difficult to see why an egalitarian concern for the
worse off compels us to do this. If an animal suffers some
harm, it’s irrelevant for her or his situation whether we or
someone else have caused that harm (at least when that harm is
totally undeserved). In fact, this is something that many other
ethical theories take into account just as egalitarianism does.
All that is required for this is that an ethical theory prescribes
two things: (a) that it’s bad that someone suffers or is deprived
of her happiness, and good that she is happy or spared from
suffering; and (b) that what we should do depends, either completely or to some extent, on what is good or bad.
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Spreading Veganism
The reasons presented above imply that egalitarianism
doesn’t just require us to go vegan. It also requires us to do
activism for veganism and against speciesism (Faria 2014). In
fact, considering that we are in a far better situation than nonhuman animals are, egalitarianism requires that we spend significant time and effort on activism in order to have the greatest
possible impact in their favor. To be sure, individual vegans
who are not involved in activism have some impact on animals
already, not only by reducing the demand for animal products
and services, but by making veganism more visible in society
as well. However, an activist, even if she doesn’t work full time
for nonhuman animals, makes a much more significant impact
than several (or perhaps many) inactive vegans.
Helping Animals in Nature
As egalitarianism implies rejecting speciesism, it entails
that we should help those in need regardless of whether they are
humans, nonhumans either enslaved by or living with humans,
or nonhumans living in the wild. Of course, we shouldn’t help
anyone if it means leaving others in a worse situation than
where those we’ve helped began. But when we can aid those
who are suffering or dying in the wild in a way that increases
happiness and equality and reduces the harms suffered by sentient beings overall, we should do it (Sapontzis 1987; Ng 1995;
Cowen 2003; Fink 2005; Nussbaum 2006; Holtug 2007; Horta
2010b; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Sözmen 2013; Faria and
Paez 2015; Cunha 2015; Tomasik 2015a; Torres 2015).
Many people are puzzled at this suggestion because they
agree with a widespread idyllic view of nature according to
which nonhuman animals live great lives in the wild (notable
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exceptions include Mill 1904 [1874]; Darwin 2005 (1908), 94;
Gould 1994 and Dawkins 1995). Unfortunately, animal population dynamics gives us strong reasons to conclude that this is
not the case. The vast majority of animals reproduce by having
huge numbers of offspring. A female mouse can give birth to
more than a hundred babies, other animals such as frogs and
many invertebrates can lay thousands of eggs, and some species of fishes can lay millions, or even hundreds of millions of
eggs (Sagoff 1984; Stearns 1992, 151; Ng 1995). On average,
only one offspring per parent survives (otherwise we would
see populations multiplying astronomically all the time). Most
of the others die shortly after coming into existence, often in
painful ways, such as starving or being eaten by other animals
(Ng 1995; Faria and Paez 2015; Tomasik 2015a). Their very
short lives often contain little more than their painful deaths,
meaning that they include more suffering than happiness. In
addition, even those animals that survive to maturity suffer for
a number of reasons, including disease and parasitism, hunger and malnutrition, injuries, attacks by other animals, hostile
weather conditions and sometimes psychological stress. This
shows that the suffering of nonhuman animals in the wild is a
very serious issue and that in those cases in which we can help
these animals without causing more harm, we have reasons
to do it. This conclusion can be reached from many different
viewpoints, though it has remained largely unaddressed until
recently. It is one that both deontological theories making room
for positive rights and utilitarianism will accept. Virtue and
care ethics approaches that regard helping those in need as part
of what virtuous or caring agents should do will also support it.
It is also a conclusion that follows from egalitarianism.
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7. Why the Interests of Nonhuman Animals
Should Be a Priority
In spite of what we have just seen, some might agree that
egalitarians should do activism to help the worse off, but still
claim that they need not do activism for nonhuman animals and
should focus on those humans in need of help instead.
This would be right if human beings were worse off than
nonhuman animals. This is a very intuitive view, as we are all
aware that many humans find themselves in appalling situations. However, it’s also intuitive to most of us because we fail
to properly imagine what the situation of nonhuman animals is
really like. Suppose you could choose between either living the
life of a malnourished human in poverty or that of an immobilized rabbit whose eyes are destroyed by chemicals without
any painkiller, only to be killed afterwards. Or between that
of a war refugee or that of a calf separated from his mother,
kept in isolation in a crate so small he cannot turn around, and
killed a few weeks later. Or between that of a child working
under terribly exploitative conditions in a dangerous factory
in a poor country or that of a small fish who after getting out
of her egg, fails to find any food and starves to death. No one
would truly believe that the lives of these nonhuman animals
are better than these humans’ lives, even though the humans
are in terrible situations. It’s true that there are humans who
face excruciating suffering at certain points in their lives (for
instance, political prisoners undergoing torture, or women being raped). Yet if we consider their whole lives compared to the
lives of many nonhuman animals such as the ones mentioned
above, it doesn’t seem that the animals’ lives are preferable. We
have no grounds to assume the plight of these human beings
is more significant than the suffering of nonhumans who are
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eaten alive, fall victim to painful procedures at laboratories, or
are boiled or skinned alive at a slaughterhouse.
This is not to devalue the terrible situation of many humans
such as the ones mentioned above. It just means recognizing
that the assumption that nonhuman animals can’t be in situations that are as bad or worse is no longer tenable when we look
closely at to what the lives of nonhuman animals are really like.
It is likely that many people will deny this, not out of an impartial assessment of the situation of nonhumans and humans,
but rather because they have much less empathy for the former
than for the latter.
This doesn’t mean that every nonhuman animal fares worse
than every human being. In fact, there are huge differences
between the situations of different humans, and the same is
true of nonhuman animals. There is an (unfortunately tiny)
minority of nonhuman animals who live happy lives. Some
nonhuman animals are therefore better off than some humans.
It is also true, however, that very few humans have lives as
bad overall as the lives that many animals have to endure. It is
safe to conclude that, in general, humans are the better off and
nonhumans are the worse off. Accordingly, if we accept egalitarianism, we must reject the common assumption that human
interests should take priority over those of nonhuman animals.
When we consider the number of individuals involved, this
conclusion is reinforced. Up to 60 billion mammals and birds
are killed in slaughterhouses each year (FAO 2014). The number of aquatic animals killed by humans is much higher. It has
been estimated that between 1 and 3 trillion aquatic vertebrates
or more were fished in 2009 (Mood 2010). In addition, humans
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kill or inflict terrible suffering on millions of other animals for
other purposes.
Given that human beings currently live seven decades on
average, and that the number of human beings is now around
7 billion (US Census Bureau 2014), this means that during our
lifetime, dozens of trillions of animals are harmed very significantly. For each of us, many thousand nonhuman animals are
harmed terribly.
This does not even include the colossal number of animals
suffering in nature, in situations in which humans are capable
of helping. According to some estimates, the number of animals
excluding nematodes (but including arthropods) living in the
wild may be many orders of magnitude higher than the number
of animals killed by humans every year, reaching between 1018
and 1021 (Tomasik 2015b [2009]). Let us assume the more conservative end of that figure. Suppose now, again conservatively,
that for each adult animal only 100 baby animals die in misery
shortly after coming into existence (even though, as we saw
above, many animals lay thousands or even millions of eggs).
That would mean that the total number of baby animals whose
lives consist in little more than dying just after starting to exist
would be around 1020. This is a staggering figure, more than
ten billion times higher than the number of human beings alive.
To be sure, there are other reasons one might give priority to
nonhuman animals. For instance, there are many more people
doing activism for humans than for nonhuman animals, which,
added to the fact that they are the worse off, makes helping
nonhuman animals more efficient in terms of promoting wellbeing. But these are different reasons from the one presented
above, and egalitarianism would still require us to pay special
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attention to nonhuman animals even if it wasn’t the most efficient way to maximize wellbeing.

8. Why the Appeal to the Status of Humans
Doesn’t Limit the Extent of Egalitarian Concern
for Nonhuman Animals
One theorist who has written about equality and animals,
Peter Vallentyne (2004), has tried to resist the argument presented above. He wonders if we could say that humans have
a higher moral status, so their interests should count for more
even when their interests are less important ones. However, this
argument doesn’t work. If our theory defends equality of some
value, then the capacity to be a recipient of that value is what
matters. So if we defend a view that aims to reduce inequality
in the wellbeing of different individuals, then the capacity to
have a (positive or negative) wellbeing is the only morally relevant circumstance, and any other capacities or circumstances are morally irrelevant. If an appeal to moral status entails
something different from the consideration of the capacity to
have a wellbeing, then such an appeal can’t be grounded on
anything morally relevant.
Nils Holtug (2007) has pointed out that there is a reason
that explains why Vallentyne and others try to avoid the nonspeciesist consequences of egalitarianism: we have all grown
up in speciesist societies, and, as a result of it, most people have
strongly speciesist attitudes. We are taught during our whole
lives that humans have greater moral worth than nonhuman
animals, so this seems obviously true to us. However, once we
get rid of speciesist biases we can see that equality for all sentient animals follows from accepting egalitarianism.
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9. Why Egalitarianism Gives Us Extra Reasons
to Defend Nonhuman Animals
Egalitarianism agrees with other ethical views that we
should reject speciesism, but it differs in the practical corollaries that follow from rejecting speciesism. We will now compare what egalitarianism and other views prescribe.
Why Egalitarianism Rejects Sacrificing the Worse Off
for the Sake of Aggregated Happiness
First, consider the view that we should maximize the sum
total of happiness minus suffering, regardless of its distribution
(as utilitarianism claims). Contrary to this view, an egalitarian
would not accept animal exploitation even if the harm inflicted
on the exploited was smaller than the benefit that others would
obtain from that exploitation. We can understand their opposition in light of the two examples from section 1. In those examples, the actions that Robin Hood and the managers of the
animal shelter take reduce the total sum of happiness. While
utilitarians would oppose these actions and the resulting decrease in total happiness, egalitarianism supports them, as they
lead to a better distribution of happiness in favor of the worse
off.
Why Egalitarianism Claims No Right or Partiality Can
Justify Favoring the Better Off over the Worse Off
We might think that protecting the worse off is actually the
motivation why many people defend rights views. They may
think it unfair, for instance, that some have to fare ill because
that’s good for the ones that are better off, as utilitarianism
may in some cases entail. And they may think that the way to
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defend the worse off from this is by claiming that we should all
have rights that can never be violated.
However, this isn’t so. It’s possible that by respecting someone’s rights we could harm the worse off and perpetuate inequality, as the Robin Hood example shows. Recall that in that
example the better off have a right not to have any of their
wealth taken from them. If by taking away some of what’s
theirs, we could benefit others who are equally deserving but
worse off, then respecting that right will only maintain inequality. So egalitarianism claims that Robin Hood does the
right thing.
Just as utilitarianism allows us to harm (or refuse to help)
the worse off as long as it sufficiently benefits those who are
better off, rights theories that protect the better off from any
redistribution of benefits are also harmful for the worse off.
This cannot be accepted from an egalitarian viewpoint (setting
aside matters of desert and responsibility). Of course, if thwarting the interests of the better off would leave them in an even
worse situation than the situation in which the worse off began,
then egalitarianism would reject doing it.
On the other hand, sometimes people use the term “rights”
to mean simply that individuals need to be morally considered.
If we accept this definition, then it is clear that egalitarians
must accept and defend the proposition that all sentient individuals have rights.
Also, according to most current legal systems, nonhuman
animals are considered things; they have the legal status of
property. Egalitarians can reject this and advocate the granting
of legal rights to nonhuman animals because legal protection
of the interests of individuals is carried out by means of legal
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rights. However, favoring legal rights because they currently
are the best way the law can protect the interests of all sentient
beings does not undermine the above critique of moral rights
theories that oppose equality. In addition, if some legal rights
reinforce inequality, then they shouldn’t be accepted.
In a similar vein, egalitarianism also opposes giving priority
to some who are better off over the worse off because of some
special or close relationship we share with them. The reasons
for this have been stated above when we saw the different ways
in which speciesism is defended. The existence of a certain
type of relationship with someone is not by itself relevant to
being better off or worse off, so according to egalitarians it
shouldn’t be a reason for one’s interest to take priority over the
interests of others.
Why Egalitarianism Focuses on the Situation of Sentient
Beings, rather than on Our Moral Character or Relations
Some other viewpoints in ethics don’t state specific courses
of action we should follow, but instead claim that there are certain character traits we should have. Those who take these approaches can still defend the same courses of action that egalitarians support by claiming that those with a sound moral character should care primarily for the worse off. However, they
may also reject this line of thinking, and thus disagree with
what egalitarianism prescribes. On the other hand, egalitarians
claim that what’s fundamentally important is not really whether moral agents have a good moral character or not, but whether
their decisions benefit those who need it. They can argue that if
ethics has any sense at all, it is because it can make the world a
better place. But if this is so, what matters is actually how in-
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dividuals are affected, for good or bad, by the actions of moral
agents, rather than whether agents display a good character.

10. Conclusion
There’s a considerably extensive literature on speciesism
and animal ethics nowadays, and a far more extensive literature on egalitarianism. Despite this, most theorists of egalitarianism have never reckoned the very important consequences
for nonhuman animals that this theory has. Also, there are
many opponents of the discrimination of nonhuman animals
who aren’t familiar with egalitarianism. This is all quite understandable, given, firstly, the wide prevalence of speciesism,
and secondly, that many of those who have written in animal
ethics have defended other ethical approaches. However, it’s
high time for all this to change. Many people have egalitarian
ideas, even though they may have never heard of egalitarian
theory. Many of us oppose inequality, and think the worse off
deserve special attention. We have seen that this position has
important consequences for nonhuman animals. They include
rejecting speciesism, not harming them for our benefit, getting
involved in doing activism for them, and being ready to help
them, especially in the case of those living in the wild. Moreover, egalitarianism also entails that, given the situation many
nonhuman animals currently are in, concern for them should
be a priority for us.
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